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Abstract—User-generated content sites routinely block contri-
butions from users of privacy-enhancing proxies like Tor because
of a perception that proxies are a source of vandalism, spam,
and abuse. Although these blocks might be effective, collateral
damage in the form of unrealized valuable contributions from
anonymity seekers is invisible. One of the largest and most
important user-generated content sites, Wikipedia, has attempted
to block contributions from Tor users since as early as 2005.
We demonstrate that these blocks have been imperfect and
that thousands of attempts to edit on Wikipedia through Tor
have been successful. We draw upon several data sources and
analytical techniques to measure and describe the history of Tor
editing on Wikipedia over time and to compare contributions
from Tor users to those from other groups of Wikipedia users.
Our analysis suggests that although Tor users who slip through
Wikipedia’s ban contribute content that is more likely to be
reverted and to revert others, their contributions are otherwise
similar in quality to those from other unregistered participants
and to the initial contributions of registered users.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a Wikipedia reader using the Tor Browser notices a
stylistic error or missing fact and clicks the “Edit” button to
fix it, they see a message like the one reproduced in Fig. 1.
Wikipedia informs would-be Tor contributors that they, like
others using open proxy systems to protect their privacy, have
been preemptively blocked from contributing. Wikipedia is not
alone in the decision to block participation from anonymity-
seeking users. Although service providers vary in their ap-
proaches, users of privacy-enhancing technologies are unable
to participate in a broad range of online experiences [21].
In this work, we attempt to measure the value of contribu-
tions made by the privacy-seeking community and compare
these contributions to those by other users. We focus on the
users of a single service, Wikipedia, and a single privacy-
protecting technology, Tor, to understand what is lost when a
user-generated content site systematically blocks contributions
from users of privacy-enhancing technologies.
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the page a user is shown when they attempt to edit the
Wikipedia article on “Privacy” while using Tor.
In particular, we make use of the fact that Wikipedia’s
mechanism of blocking Tor users has been imperfect to
identify and extract 11,363 edits made by Tor users to English
Wikipedia between 2007 and 2018. We analyze how some
Tor users managed to slip through Wikipedia’s block and
describe how we constructed our dataset of Tor edits. We use
this dataset to compare the edits of people using Tor (Tor
editors) with three different control sets of time-matched edits
by other Wikipedia contributor populations: (1) non-logged
in users editing from non-Tor IP addresses whose edits are
credited to their IP address (IP editors), (2) people logged
into accounts making their first edit (First-time editors), and
(3) people logged into accounts with more than one edit using
the same account (Registered editors).
Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative tech-
niques, we find that while Tor editors are more likely to
revert someone’s work and to be reverted, other indicators of
quality suggest that their contributions are similar to those of
IP editors and First-time editors. In an exploratory analysis,
we fit topic models to Wikipedia articles and find intriguing
differences between the kinds of topics that Tor users and other
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Wikipedia editors contribute to. We conclude with a discussion
of how user-generated sites like Wikipedia might accept contri-
butions from the millions of daily users of privacy-enhancing
technologies like Tor1 in ways that benefit both the websites
and society.
II. RELATED WORK
Most people seek out anonymity online at some time or
another [12]. Their reasons for doing so range from seeking
help and support [1], exploring or disclosing one’s identity
[2, 18, 36], protecting themselves when contributing to online
projects [14], seeking information, pursuing hobbies, and
engaging in activities that may violate copyright such as file
sharing [20].
Anonymity can confer important benefits, not just for the
individual seeking anonymity but also for the collective good
of online communities [20, 31]. The use of anonymity in col-
laborative learning has been demonstrated to improve equity,
participation rates, and creative thinking [7]. Research suggests
that anonymity can support self-expression and self-discovery
among young people [13]. For instance, researchers found
that anonymity helps users discuss topics that are stigmatized
[1, 8].
Despite the range of legitimate reasons that people adopt
anonymity to interact on the Internet and the benefits to col-
laborative communities, many websites systematically block
traffic coming from anonymity-seeking users of systems like
Tor.2 According to Khattak et al., at least 1.3 million IP
addresses blocked Tor at the TCP/IP level as of 2015, and
“3.67% of the top 1,000 Alexa sites are blocking people using
computers running known Tor exit-node IP addresses” [21].
Of course, websites do not block anonymity tools like Tor
for no reason. Research has shown that online anonymity is
sometimes associated with toxic behaviors that are hard to
control [23]. Traffic analysis of Tor in 2010 found a substantial
portion of network activity is associated with peer-to-peer
applications such as BitTorrent [5]. Another report made by
Sqreen,3 an application protection service, claims that “a
user coming from Tor is between six and eight times more
likely to perform an attack” on their website, such as path
scanning and SQL/NoSQL injection. Tor exit node operators
often receive complaints of “copyright infringement, reported
hacking attempts, IRC bot network controls, and web page
defacements” [27]. The most frequent complaints about Tor
users’ negative behavior are DCMA violations, which made up
99.74% of the approximately three million email complaints
sent to exit operators from Torservers.net from June, 2010 to
April, 2016 [33].
A third perspective suggests that anonymity seeking behav-
ior is neither “good” nor “bad” and that anonymous users
1https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html (Archived: https:
//perma.cc/B5W4-UG7C)
2https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/doc/
ListOfServicesBlockingTor (Archived: https://perma.cc/E49X-MBSE)
3https://blog.sqreen.io/tor-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/ (Archived:
https://perma.cc/38RG-R8JG)
are best understood as largely similar to other users. Studies
of anonymous behaviors on Quora have found that answers
from anonymous contributors are no worse than answers given
by registered users and the only significant difference is that
“with anonymous answers, social appreciation correlated with
the answer’s length” [25]. Furthermore, Mani et al.’s study
of the domains visited by Tor users showed that 80% of the
websites visited by Tor users are in the Alexa top one million,
giving further evidence that Tor users are similar to the overall
Internet population [24].
Although the tradeoffs between anonymity’s benefits and
threats have been investigated and discussed from many per-
spectives, the question of what value anonymous contributions
might bring to contexts where they are disallowed is difficult
to answer. How does one estimate the value of something that
is not happening? By examining the relatively small number of
Tor edits that slipped through Wikipedia’s restriction between
2007–2018, we hope to begin doing just that. In the next
sections, we explain the context of our data collection and
analysis as well as the methods we used to identify a dataset
of Wikipedia edits from Tor.
III. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT
A. Tor
The Tor network consists of volunteer-run servers that allow
users to connect to the Internet without revealing their IP
address. Rather than users making a direct connection to a
destination website, Tor routes traffic through a series of relays
that conceal the origin and route of a user’s Internet traffic.
Within Tor, each relay only knows the immediate sender and
the next receiver of the data but not the complete path that the
data packet will take. The destination receives only the final
relay in the route (called the “exit node”), not the Tor user’s
original IP address. The list of all Tor nodes is published so
that Tor clients can pick relays for their circuits. This public
list also allows the public to determine whether or not a given
IP address is a Tor exit node at a given point in time. Some
websites, including Wikipedia, use these lists of exit nodes to
restrict traffic from the Tor network.
B. Wikipedia
As one of the largest peer production websites, Wikipedia
receives vast numbers of contributions every day. While
Wikipedia is available in many languages, English Wikipedia
is the largest edition with the most articles, active users,
and viewers.4 As of February 2019, the English language
Wikipedia “develops at a rate of 1.8 edits per second” with
more than 136,000 registered editors who contribute each
month.5 When these registered editors change something, their
username is credited with that edit. Wikipedia also allows
people to contribute without asking them to sign up or log
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Wikipedias (Archived: https://perma.
cc/V2UQ-LBCB)
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Statistics (Archived:
https://perma.cc/4WCW-RNSM)
in. In these cases, the contributor’s IP address is credited with
the change.
Wikipedia’s low barriers to participation have subjected the
website to vandalism and poor-quality editing. In Wikipedia,
vandalism refers to the deliberate degradation of an article
either by removing part of the existing work or adding
damaging content. Erasing the full text of articles and adding
profanity or racial slurs are common forms of vandalism.
The Wikipedia community invests enormous resources into
minimizing and mitigating vandalism. Using a combination
of bots and humans, the Wikipedia community has developed
banning mechanisms to mitigate repeated attempts from indi-
viduals who repeatedly sabotage the community’s work. For
example, if someone is detected vandalizing an article, their
account’s privilege to edit on Wikipedia might be halted and
the IP address of their device might be banned from editing
in the future. Of course, this does not stop more tech-savvy
saboteurs from using methods to change their online identities
and continuing to cause damage [15].
Skepticism about anonymity-seeking users has been evident
from the early years of Wikipedia. In messages from the
the archives of Wikipedia’s public mailing lists from 2002
and 2004, Wikipedia’s founder Jimmy Wales argued that
users without accounts should be treated differently and that
anonymous users represented a problem for Wikipedia.6 In
2005, English Wikipedia blocked anonymous users from cre-
ating pages.7 Between 2008 and 2013, there was an extended
discussion in the Wikipedia community about how to most
effectively block contributions by Tor users.8
Conversations in Wikipedia about allowing anonymity-
seeking contributors have rarely discussed the benefits that
may flow from allowing them. Recent qualitative research has
shown that open-content production sites like Wikipedia value
certain forms of anonymous contributions because they can
lower barriers to participation but rarely consider other reasons
that someone might want to be participate anonymously [28].
Other work has illuminated the reasons that people want to
participate anonymously [14] and the kinds of good-faith con-
tributions they make [6]. This work highlights the differences
between service providers’ perceptions of what anonymity is
good for and what contributors think. As part of this conver-
sation, some Wikipedia users have voiced their concern that
the blocking of Tor was not justified and suggested that there
had been “no quantitative information about the frequency and
size of [problems created by Tor users].” Although Wikipedia
contributors have occasionally discussed lifting the site’s ban
on Tor in the mailing lists9 and the “Wikipedia talk: Blocking
6https://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikien-l/2002-November/
000087.html (Archived: https://perma.cc/6XQ7-SMP8) https://lists.
wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikien-l/2004-February/010659.html (Archived:
https://perma.cc/56TW-85V3)
7https://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikien-l/2005-December/033880.
html (Archived: https://perma.cc/DRR8-63PT)
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia talk:Blocking policy/Tor nodes
(Archived: https://perma.cc/UT2L-VF27)
9https://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikien-l/2002-November/000087.
html (Archived: https://perma.cc/6XQ7-SMP8)
Fig. 2. Number of edits per month by Tor users to English Wikipedia between
2007 and 2018.
Policy/Tor nodes” discussion page,10 the Tor network remains
restricted.
IV. TOR EDITS TO WIKIPEDIA
A. Identifying Tor edits
Edits to Wikipedia made from Tor are attributed to an
IP address and appear just like contributions from other
unregistered editors. To identify edits as coming from Tor,
we first used a complete history database dump of the English
Wikipedia and obtained metadata of all revisions made on
Wikipedia up to March 1, 2018.11 This metadata included
revision ID, revision date, editor’s username or IP address,
article ID or title, and article “namespace” (a piece of metadata
used to categorize types of pages on Wikipedia).
The Tor metrics site maintains the list of exit nodes run
by volunteers.12 As the name suggests, the exit list consists
of “known exits and corresponding exit IP addresses available
in a specific format.” Exit list data goes back to February
22, 2010 and is updated and archived every hour. Each
archive has details of exit nodes available at the time the list
was produced. Most websites that restrict access from Tor,
including Wikipedia, have relied on this list.
When we consulted with the Tor metrics team, we were
told that this information is not 100% complete. Before a
node is picked to be an exit node, the Tor network uses
dedicated servers to determine whether or not it meets the
requirements necessary to function as part of the Tor network.
These dedicated servers are called directory authorities, and
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia talk:Blocking policy/Tor nodes
(Archived: https://perma.cc/SBZ5-BGMP)
11https://dumps.wikimedia.org/ (Archived: https://perma.cc/2G26-G2TJ)
12https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html (Archived: https://perma.cc/
DTC3-TALT)
they are in charge of making the available and eligible relays
reach a consensus to form a network. Once a consensus is
reached, the exit nodes become effective at the time indicated
by the directory authorities. This consensus-building process
can happen several hours before the exit list is updated.
As a result, the use of both the consensus and the exit lists
is necessary to identify a comprehensive list of exit nodes
because sometimes nodes that do not meet the criteria for
an exit flag (an identifier flagged by the dedicated server to
indicate that a relay is qualified to be an exit node) end up
becoming exit nodes anyway due to their exit policy (a set
of rules set up by the owner of the relay to dictate how the
relay should be operated) [21]. Our dataset of Tor exit nodes
reflects a comprehensive set of all exit nodes drawn from both
these sources with the specific time periods that the nodes were
active.
We crosschecked the IP address and timestamp for every
contribution credited to an IP address on Wikipedia to identify
any edit from a Tor exit node IP within a period that the node
was active. The IP addresses of users who are logged into
accounts are not retained by the Wikimedia Foundation for
more than a short period of time and are never made public.
As a result, we could not identify edits made by registered
Wikipedia users using Tor. Finally, we queried the timestamps
of the identified revisions in the Tor relay search tool called
ExoneraTor to verify that the IP addresses were indeed active
exit nodes around the same time. We extracted and found a
total of 11,363 edits on English Wikipedia made by Tor users
between 2007 (the earliest available Tor consensus data) and
March 2018 when our Wikipedia database dump was created.
Fig. 2 displays the number of Tor edits to English Wikipedia
per month over time. The spikes in the graph suggest that there
were occasions when Wikipedia failed to ban exit nodes and
Tor revisions were able to slip through. These larger spikes
appear at least five times in the graph before late 2013, when
the edit trend finally died down and failed to rise back up
again. We have posted the full dataset of Tor edits to Wikipedia
and the code we used to conduct these analyses in a repository
posted to the Harvard Dataverse where they will be available
by request.13
B. How Wikipedia blocked Tor over time
To better understand why Tor users were able to edit
Wikipedia at certain times but not others, we examined the
history of Wikipedia’s Tor blocking and banning mechanisms.
We found that there are two ways Wikipedia members prevent
Tor users from editing: (1) blocking the IP address using the
TorBlock14 extension for MediaWiki, the software that was
installed on the servers that run Wikipedia, and (2) banning
by blacklisting individual exit node IP addresses in a piece-
meal process conducted by individual administrators and bots
on Wikipedia. In 2008, Wikipedia started using the TorBlock
extension to block Tor. TorBlock is a script that “automatically
13https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/O8RKO2
14https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:TorBlock (Archive: https://
perma.cc/G44N-Y75R)
TABLE I
BAN ACTIONS AGAINST TOR EXIT NODES
Ban actions Number
Ban actions against all Tor exit nodes 45,130
Ban actions against Tor exit nodes with at least one edit 4,964
Number of Tor exit nodes banned 32,947
Number of Tor exit nodes with at least 1 edit banned 2,148
Ban actions citing vandalism 532
Ban actions citing Tor ban policy 34,797
applies restrictions to Tor exit node’s access to the wiki’s
front-door server.” This extension preemptively limits access
from all active Tor nodes by pulling the current exit list
published by Tor, as described in §IV-A. One benefit of using
TorBlock is that only active Tor exit nodes are prevented
from creating accounts and editing. As soon as IP addresses
stop volunteering as Tor exit nodes, they are restored to full
access by TorBlock. However, as described by a Wikipedia
administrator, the TorBlock extension did not seem to work
well initially and also went down occasionally.15 As a result,
Wikipedia administrators continued to issue bans manually and
relied on bots to catch Tor nodes that were able to slip through.
Using publicly available data that Wikipedia maintains on
bans, we traced the list of banned Tor IPs from 2007 to 2018.
Wikipedia’s block log provides details about the timestamp of
each ban action, the enforcer’s username, the duration of the
ban, and optional comment justifying bans. Unsurprisingly,
most IPs in this list are described as being banned simply
because they are Tor exit nodes. Table I provides an overview
of the ban actions against Tor IP addresses over the course of
11 years. There were a total of 45,130 ban actions against
IP addresses that were used as Tor exit nodes during this
period. Roughly 11% of these bans were against Tor IPs
that successfully made at least one edit. Ban actions executed
before a single edit took place suggest that many IP addresses
were preemptively banned by Wikipedia. We found that less
than 2% of the ban actions explicitly state that they are due to
vandalism. On the other hand, 77.1% of the actions mention
the word “Tor.” These statistics provide both a picture of
Wikipedia’s policy in relation to anonymity-seeking users and
a validation of our methodology for identifying Tor edits.
Bans on Wikipedia can be issued by either administrators
or bots. Our data on ban actions shows that, initially, Tor
IP bans were mainly handled by administrators with 95.9%
of 7,852 ban actions issued by administrators from 2007 to
2009. Bans during this period were typically 1–5 years in
duration. However, IP addresses typically spend only a short
period of time volunteering as Tor exit nodes.16 Banning these
IPs for extended periods of time prevented these addresses
from editing on Wikipedia even when they were no longer Tor
nodes. From 2010 to early 2014, Wikipedia started employing
bots to automatically spot and blacklist Tor nodes. During this
15https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Bots/Requests for approval/
TorNodeBot (Archived: https://perma.cc/SGS2-7BMZ)
16https://nymity.ch/sybilhunting/uptime-visualisation/ (Archived: https://
perma.cc/MH2P-CFWN)
period, the typical ban duration was reduced to two weeks.
Although many exit nodes were only active for a portion of
this ban period, some large nodes were active for much longer.
In some cases, bans expired while a node was still active and,
as a result, we found many nodes were banned multiple times
with multiple edits made between bans.
Additionally, Tor users frequently slipped past Wikipedia’s
TorBlock in systematic ways that appear to explain the sharp
drop in the number of Tor edits from 2007 to 2009 and
frequent spikes in edits from 2010 to 2013. A Wikipedia
administrator explained that the TorBlock tool only checked
for the current list of Tor nodes, but when some of them
were shut off abruptly, their server descriptors were no longer
published on the exit list.17 If the IP addresses were then
reused as Tor nodes, they did not reappear on the list for some
time and escaped the TorBlock extension’s notice. As a result,
the admin wrote an automated tool named TorNodeBot to spot
and ban any Tor node with access to Wikipedia editing.18
TorNodeBot was active from 2010 to 2014 and is recorded to
have issued 32,123 bans on 21,837 different Tor IP addresses
during this period.
The deactivation of TorNodeBot in early 2014, along with
the significant drop of Tor edits and banning actions against
Tor nodes, suggests that the TorBlock extension started work-
ing as intended at this point in time. Only 562 edits were
made by Tor users after 2013. We suspect that these edits are
allowed because TorBlock must periodically pull the currently
active exit list from Tor, which leaves a time gap when freshly
activated nodes are not caught by the tool.
V. STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF TOR EDITS TO OTHER
GROUPS OF USERS
In addition to our dataset of Tor edits, we developed datasets
from three comparison groups—IP editors, First-time editors,
and Registered editors. IP editors are not logged into an
account so that their edits are credited to their actual (i.e.,
non-Tor) IP address. The second group includes registered
editors making their first contribution. The third group includes
registered users who have made more than one edit before the
edit in question. For each of these populations, we cannot
know if the people editing have other accounts or if they have
contributed from other IP addresses. We randomly picked the
same number of revisions from each group, time-matched with
the original dataset, by determining the number of edits made
each month by Tor users and then randomly picking the same
number of edits made by each comparison group within the
same month.
To assess the quality of contributions, we used several
measures of quality that were developed within the Wikipedia
community and by social computing researchers. Before ex-
amining the quality of these edits, however, it is important
to note that not all Wikipedia pages serve the same purpose.
17https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Bots/Requests for approval/
TorNodeBot (Archived: https://perma.cc/SGS2-7BMZ)
18https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:TorNodeBot (Archived: https://perma.
cc/VPM4-75PZ)
Although article pages are the most visible, Wikipedia con-
tains many other pages devoted to discussion, coordination,
user profiles, policy, and more. While Wikipedia has strict
guidelines about editing article pages, other types of pages
tend to have more relaxed standards.19 Although sections §V-A
and the analysis of reverts in §V-D uses data drawn from
contributions to all types of pages, the rest of our analysis
is restricted to edits made to article pages (called “namespace
0” pages in Wikipedia). We focused our analysis on article
pages for two reasons. First, article production is the primary
work of the Wikipedia community, and contributions here
have the potential to be of the greatest value. Second, the
nature of article contributions lend themselves to large-scale
computational analysis better than discussions about policy
and social interactions that require substantial interpretation in
order to be assessed for value. In addition, the current version
of TorBlock (and other forms of blocks and bans used in the
past) permit IP addresses to edit their own user talk pages in
order to allow them to contact administrators and appeal their
ban. These pages are therefore not included in our analyses.
It is important to note that the distribution of edits across
namespaces is different across the four comparison groups. For
example, Tor editors make a larger proportion of contributions
to article pages than Registered users. The distribution of edits
across namespaces is available in the Appendix (Fig. 7).
Because the number of contributions to Wikipedia from Tor
shrank drastically by the end of 2013, we divided and observed
the edits in two separate periods from 2007 to 2013 and from
2013 to 2018. Because §V-A through §V-C are focused on
identifying trends over time, we limit our analysis to the pre-
2013 datasets where data is more dense. We replicated and
compared results from §V-A through §V-C in the 2013–2018
data which we report on in §V-D. In all other sections, we
conducted analyses using the full 2007–2018 dataset.
A. Measuring contribution quality using reversion rates
The most widely used method for measuring edit quality in
Wikipedia is whether an edit has been reverted. In Wikipedia,
a contribution is said to be reverted if a subsequent edit returns
a page to a state that is identical to a point in time prior to
the edit in question and if the reverting edit is not reverted
itself. Because the term “revert” can be used in a more general
sense, these are sometimes called “identity reverts.” Because
reverting is the main way that Wikipedia editors respond to
low-quality contributions and vandalism [22], the reversion
rate can provide insight into how valuable the efforts of an
editor are perceived to be by the Wikipedia community.
We used a Python library called mwreverts20 to detect
whether or not a revision was subsequently reverted by some-
one else and whether or not an edit was was a revert action
itself undoing other revisions. We examine the reversion rate
of each set of edits in our comparison groups—both overall
19https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Namespace (Archived: https://
perma.cc/P2ZP-R4TQ)
20https://pythonhosted.org/mwreverts/ (Archived: https://perma.cc/
HG6U-U5K2)
Fig. 3. Reversion rate for edits from different groups of editors over time
(2008–2013).
and by year. Fig. 3 plots how the reversion rate of article
pages changes over time for each group of editors. Overall,
41.12% of Tor edits on article pages are reverted, while only
30.3% of IP edits, 35.2% of First-time edits, and 5.5% of
Registered edits are reverted. A proportional z-test shows that
the reversion rate of Tor edits is significantly higher than the
closest group, First-time edits (z = 11.53; p < 0.01).21 These
numbers are similar for the reversion rates across all edits
(special namespace articles included): 42.0% for Tor edits,
29.61% for IP edits, 34.3% for First-time edits, and 4.84%
for Registered edits.
Reversion rate might be a biased measure of quality because
good quality edits made via Tor might be reverted simply
because they violate Wikipedia’s policy blocking Tor. To
assess whether this is in some cases true, one of the authors
examined the 4,972 instances in which a Tor-based editor’s
work was reverted and hand coded the “edit summaries”
left behind by the person performing the reversion. In 2,848
instances (57.3% of the cases), no edit summary was entered as
part of the revert action. Of the 2,124 reverts where the person
doing the reverting provided an edit summary, 162 (7.6% of
reverts giving a reason) referred to conditions relevant to being
a Tor user, with one or more of the following keywords: “Tor,”
“sock,” “block”, “ban” (referring to the ban policy of Tor IPs),
“proxy,” “masked,” “puppet,” “ip hopper,” “no edit history,”
“multiple IP,” “dynamic IP,” or “log in” (as in “please log in”
or “you can’t log in”). To the degree that other community
members were more suspicious of Tor editors, reversion rate
may be underestimating the quality of their contributions.
B. Revert actions and their success rate
A study of contributions to Wikipedia by Javanmardi et
al. [19] showed that IP editors’ contributions were twice as
21A Bonferonni correction for tests against our three comparisons groups
results in an adjusted threshold of α = 0.017. We use this threshold when
reporting statistical significance throughout. It is worth noting that because
many of our findings are null results, an unadjusted α = 0.05 threshold is
more conservative.
likely to be reverted and that registered users were almost three
times more likely to revert another user as IP editors. We found
that the latter is not the case for Tor editors. As illustrated
in Table II, we found that Tor users, similar to Registered
users, are much more likely than IP editors to revert others.
Although Tor users are still statistically less likely to revert
edits than Registered users (z = −5.19, p < 0.01), less than
one third of their revert actions are allowed to stand by the
Wikipedia community. This paints a stark contrast with the
other groups whose revert actions are all much more likely to
be kept. Overall, Tor editors revert others more frequently but
less effectively. This points to an important difference in the
behavior of Tor users and our comparison groups. When we
excluded these cases of reverted reverts, Tor edits are much
more likely to be kept. Indeed, non-reverts by Tor users are
accepted at a rate that is comparable to First-time editors
(z = −1.44; p = 0.15).
A deeper look into Tor revert actions reveals additional
insights. First, Tor users are more likely to revert edits to
non-articles. 28.2% of Tor users’ revert actions focus on non-
article namespace articles while less than 12% of revert actions
from other groups do so. Tor users’ reverts to non-articles are
themselves reverted 85.16% of the time. We also find that these
revert actions primarily target Talk pages, such as Article Talk
pages, and User Talk pages.
Research by Yaserri et al. has shown that a “considerable
portion of talk pages are dedicated to discussions about
removed materials and controversial edits” [39]. These discus-
sions often resulted in extended back and forth between those
editors who rarely change their opinion and can often lead to
“edit wars.” An edit war happens when “editors who disagree
about the content of a page repeatedly override each other’s
contributions,” changing the content of the page back and forth
between versions [4].22 In November 2004, the Wikipedia
community issued a guideline known as the three-revert rule
(3RR), which prohibits an editor from performing “more than
three reverts, in whole or in part, whether involving the same
or different material, on a single page within a 24-hour period.”
Anyone who violates this rule is at risk of being banned by
Wikipedia administrators. In this way, the 3RR creates an
incentive to seek anonymity.
To identify edit wars and violations of the 3RR, we exam-
ined the revision history of Tor edits in chronological order.
We excluded self-revert actions because reverting one’s own
edit is allowed. Among 1,577 Tor revert actions, we found 30
3RR violations with a total of 180 revert actions made across
30 different articles. While the edit wars in our dataset rarely
lasted more than several days and most of these violations
did not last long before the Tor IP addresses were banned,
this analysis provides evidence that Tor was used to engage
in edit warring in violation of Wikipedia policy. We further
reviewed these reverts and found that 56% of the 180 edits
are made on User Talk pages. A common pattern involved
22https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Edit warring (Archived: https://
perma.cc/W5UZ-L4YD)
TABLE II
REVERT ACTIONS AND REVERT SUCCESS RATE
Group Revert actions1 Reverts kept2 Non-revert actions Non-reverts kept3
Tor editors 1,132 333 (29.41%) 6,619 4,224 (63.81%)
IP editors 411 291 (70.80%) 10,040 7,117 (70.88%)
First-time editors 398 254 (63.81%) 7,878 5,095 (64.67%)
Registered editors 1,189 1,049 (88.22%) 5,932 5,751 (96.94%)
1 Revert actions: Edits that revert other edits.
2 Reverts kept: Revert actions that are not reverted by other edits.
3 Non-reverts kept: Edits that do not revert other edits and do not get reverted.
a Tor user reverting warning messages posted by Wikipedia
administrators about vandalism. Unsurprisingly, 169 out of 180
Tor edits that were involved in edit wars were reverted as part
of the back-and-forth conflict.
This is a conservative measure of edit warring by Tor users.
Because of the dynamic nature of Tor IP addresses, Tor users
can simply change to a different exit address to avoid being
flagged by automated tools enforcing 3RR. As a result, we
expanded our search to find any series of more than two reverts
made on a single page within 24-hour period from any Tor
IP address. We found 546 total revisions, with 102 potential
incidents in violation of the 3RR. Our manual inspection of
dozens of these incidents suggests that, even when reverts are
made from different Tor exit node IPs, pages were typically
reverted to an older revision made by another Tor IP. This
suggests it was the same person using different exit nodes
making these reverts. Once again, the chance of these reverts
on article pages staying untouched was unlikely and 88.2% of
them were ultimately reverted.
Because our Tor dataset includes the entire population of
Tor edits, we could conduct an analysis of Tor being used
to violate 3RR. Because our comparison sets are random
samples, they are unlikely to contain consecutive edits made
by the same user. To obtain some estimate of the rate at which
other populations violate the 3RR, we retrieved all Wikipedia
reverts made within the 48-hour period following each revert
in all three of our comparison groups. Similar to findings
in previous research, we found that other user groups are
extremely unlikely to violate the 3RR policy [39]. In stark
contrast to our Tor edits, we detected only 13 violations of
the 3RR across all three comparison groups. This relatively
widespread rate of edit wars among Tor edits reflects the most
important difference between Tor editors and our comparison
groups identified in our analyses.
C. Measuring contribution quality using persistent token re-
visions
Although an edit is only treated as an identity revert if
it returns a page to a state that is identical to a previous
state, contributions might also be removed through actions
that add other content or change material. As a result, reverts
should be understood as a particular and very conservative
measure of low-quality editing. A more granular approach
to measuring edit quality involves determining whether the
parts of a contribution continue to be part of the article over
multiple future revisions. According to Halfaker et al. [16], the
survival of content over time can give important insights about
a contribution’s resistance to change and serves as a measure
of both productivity (how much text was added) and quality
(how much was retained) for a given revision.
Our approach used the mwpersistence23 library to calculate
the number of words or fragments of markup (“tokens”) added
to the articles in a given edit and then to measure how many
of these tokens persist over a fixed window of subsequent
edits. Following previous work, our measure of persistent
token revisions (PTRs) involves collapsing sequential edits by
individual users and then summing up every token added in
a given revision that continues to persist across a window of
seven revisions [29]. This measure only takes non-revert edits
into account because revert actions always have 0 PTR.
Fig. 4 describes the contribution quality of non-revert revi-
sions estimated by measuring PTRs for each edit between 2007
to 2013. We used a box plot to depict the distribution of PTRs
for edits made in each year. Apart from Registered editors,
the minimum value and the 25% quartile of other groups
are all 0. This reflects the fact that many edits to Wikipedia
remove tokens instead of adding them and lead to a PTR count
of 0. Edits that are entirely reverted also have a count of
0. The medians of the first three groups are relatively low,
mostly within the range of 0 to 10 tokens. Registered editors’
medians are higher, within the range of 10 to 40 tokens. The
interquartile regions (IQRs) in the plots of Tor editors are
slightly higher than those of IP editors and are comparable to
those of First-time editors. The triangles on the graph display
the mean PTR each year. Tor editors have some exceptional
contributions outside the 95% interval, which increases this
mean value. Overall, we calculated the mean number of PTRs
contributed by Tor editors as 547, by IP editors as 282, by
First-time editors as 456, and by Registered editors as 836.
Mann-Whitney U-tests suggest that Tor-edits have significantly
higher PTRs than IP-edits (U = 18158458, p < 0.01) and
First-time edits (U = 14104155, p < 0.01), but significantly
lower than Registered edits (U = 3095249, p < 0.01). This
provides evidence that contributions coming from Tor nodes
have relatively significant value in terms of both quantity and
quality as measured by PTRs.
23https://pythonhosted.org/mwpersistence/ (Archived: https://perma.cc/
P2F9-CA28)
Fig. 4. Measurement of PTRs of different groups of non-revert edits over time. The rectangle is the interquartile region (middle 50% of the population), with
an orange line at the median. The upper and lower whisker represent the range of the population that is 1.5 times above and below the interquartile range.
The green triangle is the mean, and the circles indicate individual observations falling outside the limit.
D. Analysis of reversion rate and persistent token revisions
after 2013
As described in §V, Wikipedia’s effort to block Tor users
made it much harder for an edit to slip through by the end
of 2013. In this section, we consider the small number of
edits made in this later period. Using the methods described
above, we computed the reversion rate and the PTRs for the
population of 536 edits made after 2013 along with the same
number of time-matched edits from other groups as described
above. The results of this analysis are reported in Table III.
Compared to the number we see from the 2007–2013
period, Tor’s reversion rate decreased from 42.1% in the
period before December 2013 to 28.2% afterward. Two other
comparison groups (IP editors and First-time editors) also
exhibit a decline in the rate of edits being reverted. This
reflects the fact that reversion rates have been in decline in
Wikipedia over time in general.24 Due to the small number of
edits each year, we were unable to properly observe whether
the change happened gradually or as a result of Wikipedia’s
more effective quality-checking methods. Overall, the rever-
sion rates of Tor editors are now statistically comparable
to IP editors (z = 0.89; p = 0.19), and First-time editors
(z = −0.67; p = 0.25). In terms of revert actions, we see a
significant decline in the number of revert actions that Tor
editors took (z = −2.5; p < 0.01) as well as in all our
comparison groups. Overall, Tor editors’ revert rate in the later
period are comparable to that of IP editors (z = 1.2; p = 0.10)
and that of Registered editors (z = 1.83; p = 0.03), but still
higher than that of First-time editors (z = 2.97; p < 0.01).
Our measure of PTR also suggests that Tor editors are at
least as high quality as IP editors and First-time editors in
the post-2013 period. Mann-Whitney U tests suggests that Tor
edits made after 2013 are of similar quality to edits by IP
editors (U = 48142; p = 0.118), of greater quality than edits
by First-time editors (U = 49692; p < 0.01), but are of lower
quality than those by Registered editors (U = 9684; p = 0.02).
This final difference is not statistically significant after a
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. While it is
24https://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/EditsRevertsEN.htm (Archived: https://
perma.cc/7WY8-MS6P)
clear that contributions from Tor users significantly improve
in many aspects after 2013, we also observe a similar pattern
in IP editors and First-time editors. As a result, it is hard to
argue that the increasing effectiveness of TorBlock extension
is the sole reason for this change.
E. Measuring quality through manual labelling
Perhaps the most compelling way to assess the quality of
Tor edits is to categorize edits manually. To do so, we con-
ducted a formal content analysis of edits. Two of the authors
and two colleagues conducted a content analysis following
guidelines laid out by Neuendorf [30] to code revisions as
Damaging or Non-Damaging. To ensure that we had a large
enough sample, we first conducted a simulation-based power
analysis, which indicated that a sample of 850 edits in each
group would be necessary to detect an underlying difference
of 7% in the proportion of damaging edits between groups
at the α = 0.05 confidence level.25 The team developed a
codebook, and after conducting three rounds of independent
coding followed by discussion of codes to develop a shared
understanding and definitions, we drew a year-matched ran-
dom subsample of 999 edits from our sample of Tor edits and
the three comparison datasets.
We defined damaging edits as those we would want to
remove from the encyclopedia because they diminished the
usefulness of the resource by being incorrect, sloppy, a
violation of Wikipedia style, or by otherwise causing the
article to be less encyclopedic. Some edits were observed to
contain both mistakes and positive contributions. We used our
judgment to assess whether the contribution was generally
positive and worthwhile, despite being imperfect. When we
did not see evidence that led us to suspect that an edit was
damaging, we followed Wikipedia’s convention of assuming
good faith and coded it as Non-Damaging.
Edits were presented to coders as a “diff” that showed what
was changed using the same interface that Wikipedia con-
tributors can use to review contributions and were presented
in a randomized order using filtering software to suppress
identity information about contributors. Coding was conducted
without reference to other contextual information, including
25A power analysis requires a minimum effect size, and we chose 7%.
TABLE III
REVERT AND PTR ANALYSES OF EDITS MADE AFTER 2013
Tor editors IP editors First-time editors Registered editors
Reversion rate 28.2% 25.0% 30.0% 5.7%
Revert actions 38 (7.0%) 28 (5.2%) 10 (1.8%) 24 (4.5%)
Mean of PTRs 645 162 310 3121
Median of PTRs 12 6 0 18
TABLE IV
RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS OF HAND-CODED QUALITY
ASSESSMENTS OF EDITS. TOR EDITORS SERVED AS THE OMITTED
CATEGORY.
Non-Damaging
Intercept 0.85∗
[0.71; 1.00]
First-time Editors −0.25∗
[−0.46; −0.05]
IP-based Editors 0.10
[−0.12; 0.31]
Registered Editors 1.69∗
[1.39; 1.99]
AIC 3551.08
BIC 3575.53
Log Likelihood -1771.54
Deviance 3543.08
Num. obs. 3337
∗ indicates that 0 is outside the 95% confidence interval.
subsequent or previous edits. Four coders conducted inde-
pendent coding and discussion of codes over several rounds.
Subsequently, they classified a dataset of 160 edits (40 from
each group) and compared their results (10 assessments were
missing from one coder). This result was a good level of
inter-rater reliability across the four coders (raw agreement of
89%; pairwise agreement of 80%; Gwet’s AC of 0.68).26 Full
agreement is unlikely because our protocol required coders to
rely on their judgement and knowledge to detect things like
misinformation without recourse to any outside information.
The full hand-coded sample includes the consensus rating of
the 160 edits evaluated in the pilot plus 800 random edits
drawn from subsamples described earlier that were coded by
each of three researchers and 840 edits coded by the fourth.
We omitted 30 revisions from our final analysis because they
were missing or otherwise deleted from Wikipedia.
The results of the from logistic regression using Tor-based
edits as the baseline are reported in Table IV. We found that
70.1% of edits made by Tor-based editors were coded as
Non-Damaging, while 72.1% of edits by IP-based editors and
64.6% of edits by First-time editors were. Although slightly
higher and lower respectively, our model suggests that the pro-
portion of Non-Damaging edits was not statistically different
than our sample of Tor edits in these two comparison groups.
We found that 92.7% of edits by Registered editors were
Non-Damaging—a statistically significant difference from our
sample of Tor edits.
26Gwet’s AC was used because it is a measure of multi-rater reliability
robust to variation in the distribution of units that raters encounter [32].
VI. CLASSIFICATION OF EDITS USING MACHINE
LEARNING TOOLS
A. Measuring contribution quality using ORES
Wikimedia uses a machine learning system called ORES
to automatically categorize the quality of contributions to
Wikipedia [17]. The system was developed to support
Wikipedia editors trying to protect the encyclopedia from
vandalism and other kinds of damage. With assistance from
the ORES team, we used the system to assess the quality of
the edits in our comparison groups. Because ORES is fully
automated, we were able to conduct our analysis on the full
datasets. ORES classifies edits in terms of the likelihood that
they are “Good Faith” and “Damaging” [17]. We recoded
Damaging as Non-Damaging so that in all cases “high” scores
are positive and “low” scores are negative.
While there exists no gold standard set of features for
assessing the quality of work on Wikipedia [10], ORES
is trained using edit quality judgments solicited from the
Wikipedia community. The system uses 24 different features
for English Wikipedia [11, 37, 38]. These include the presence
of “bad words,” informal language, whether words appear in a
dictionary, repeated characters, white space, uppercase letters,
and so on. Other features are related to the amount of text, ref-
erences, and external links added or removed in a revision. In
addition to features related to the text of a contribution, ORES
uses contribution metadata such as whether the editor supplied
an edit summary, and contributor metadata such as whether the
editor is an administrator or is using a newly created account.
The specific list of features differs by language, and a full
list is available in the publicly available ORES source code.27
Previous work has found that ORES scores are systematically
biased so that it classifies edits by IP editors and inexperienced
users as being lower quality [17].
To understand contribution quality independent of identity-
based features, we made use of the “feature injection” func-
tionality in ORES [17]. Using feature injection, we instructed
ORES to treat all revisions as if made by Registered users
whose accounts are 0 seconds old. A visualization of the
feature-injected ORES analysis of our comparison sets are
shown over time in Fig. 5. This visualization is produced
using LOESS smoothers [9].28 This model is of Good Faith
27https://github.com/wikimedia/editquality/tree/master/editquality/feature
lists (Archived: https://perma.cc/TME4-NSL6)
28LOESS plots are a visualization tool that use low-order polynomial
regression on each datapoint to calculate a smoothed fit line that describes
the data as a weighted moving average. The grey bands represent standard
errors around the LOESS estimates.
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Fig. 5. A non-parametric LOESS curve over time. We use feature injection
to instruct the ORES Good Faith model to treat all edits as if they were made
by a newly created user account.
TABLE V
LOGISTIC REGRESSION USING A FEATURE-INJECTED ORES MODEL.
FIRST-TIME EDITORS SERVED AS THE OMITTED CATEGORY.
Good Faith Non-Damaging
Intercept 0.87∗ 0.27∗
[0.82; 0.92] [0.22; 0.31]
Tor-based Editors 0.10∗ 0.14∗
[0.03; 0.17] [0.07; 0.20]
IP-based Editors 0.01 0.07∗
[−0.06; 0.08] [0.01; 0.14]
Registered Editors 0.70∗ 0.68∗
[0.62; 0.79] [0.61; 0.76]
AIC 26819.97 35414.08
BIC 26853.08 35447.18
Log Likelihood -13405.98 -17703.04
Deviance 7541.53 7395.66
Num. obs. 29057 29059
∗ indicates that 0 is outside the 95% confidence interval
measure; we omit the Non-Damaging ORES model because
the lines are extremely similar. This visualization shows that
Tor, IP, and First-time editors are all comparable, with Tor
editors appearing to make slightly higher quality contributions
than First-time and IP editors, particularly in the latter parts
of the data. We used logistic regression to test for statistical
differences, treating First-time editors as the baseline category
as they most closely resemble our feature injection scenario.
The results of our model are reported in Tab. V.
The positive coefficient for Tor in both Good Faith and Non-
Damaging scenarios indicates that Tor users are slightly better
contributors than our baseline of First-time editors by the
ORES measurement. Although the differences are statistically
significant, the estimated chance that a given edit will be
Good Faith at the baseline (new account) is 70.5%. whereas
the likelihood that an edit will be Good Faith if it originates
from a Tor editor is 72.5%. We believe that the estimated
2% margin is unlikely to be practically significant. For the
Non-Damaging model, we likewise find statistically significant
differences between Tor edits and our comparison groups but
also find that the practical effects are small. Our models predict
higher average rates of Non-Damaging edits for Tor editors
(60.1% for Tor editors versus 56.7% for First-time editors)
and IP editors (58.4%). For both models, contributions from
Registered editors are estimated to be of high quality, with a
prediction of 82.8% Good Faith and 72.1% Non-Damaging.
These results provide additional evidence in support of our
hypothesis that Tor editors, IP editors, and First-time editors
are quite similar in their overall behavior but that quality levels
of contributions from Registered editors are higher.
B. Comparison of Hand-coded Results to ORES Results
Given that we performed two different kinds of analysis
to identify Non-Damaging edits (i.e., hand-coding the edits,
and scoring via the ORES machine learning platform), we
can examine the extent to which these two measures agree.
Doing so is valuable because it can indicate whether the ORES
classifications used by Wikipedia are systematically biased
against contributors from Tor editors. As with our analysis
in §VI-A, we used feature injection to instruct ORES to treat
all edits in the hand-coded sample used in §V-E as if they
were being made by newly Registered editors. We then used
these data to compare the ORES prediction with and without
feature injection to our manual assessment for all four user
groups by generating receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves. We have included the full curves in our appendix in
Fig. 8.
Table VI reports model performance in the form of area
under the curves (AUC) for the ROC curves for each of
our comparison groups. These results indicate that there is
substantial room for improvement in ORES. Using feature
injection, ORES performs best relative to our hand-coded data
when predicting the quality of edits performed by IP editors
(AUC = 0.811 for Non-Damaging), less well for Tor editors
(AUC = 0.758), and even less well for First-time editors
(AUC = 0.704) but, strikingly, worst for Registered editors
(AUC = 0.663).
When we examined a small sample of edits where our
hand-coding and ORES disagreed, we found there were often
good reasons for the disagreement. Our hand-coding process
included doing work that ORES does not do, such as noticing
when links were to personal or spam websites and weighing
the context of the edit on the page against our own understand-
ing of appropriate and correct encyclopedic content. These
results suggest that machine learning tools such as ORES have
a limited ability to assess the quality of edits without human
intervention.
Systematic bias in ORES could result in higher rates of
rejection of contributions from some groups of editors. Feature
injection as we have done it treats registered editors as if they
are new—essentially removing a “benefit of the doubt” based
on their longevity in the community. Table VI shows that fea-
ture injection has very modest effects on model performance—
dropping AUC by 0.01 for Registered editors and by 0.004
TABLE VI
CLASSIFIER AUC OF ORES WITH AND WITHOUT FEATURE INJECTION
FOR OUR FOUR SAMPLES OF EDITS.
AUC w/ Injection AUC w/o Injection
First-time Editors 0.704 0.708
IP Editors 0.811 0.814
Tor Editors 0.758 0.753
Registered Editors 0.663 0.673
for First-time editors while improving AUC by 0.005 for Tor
editors and by 0.003 for IP editors.
The team that developed ORES published a set of recom-
mended operating points. For example, they suggest that users
developing fully automated systems (“bots” below) maximize
recall at a precision of ≥90%. They suggest that users devel-
oping a human-involved system maximize filter rate (that is,
the number that are not routed for review) at recall ≥75%.
ORES provides an interface to use preferred constraints to
select an optimized decision-making threshold. For example,
if we use the provided “bot” constraint, ORES recommends
an operating point threshold of .055; that is a bot should only
automatically discard an edit if the Non-Damaging level is
below 5.5%. We examine our results using these thresholds to
understand how ORES would classify Tor edits in Wikipedia’s
normal workflow.
The predicted values we report in Table VII describe ORES’
predictions about its own performance based on its training
data using these recommended thresholds. Our results indicate
that while a system that uses bots can identify a small pro-
portion of damaging edits made through Tor, many damaging
edits are missed while many Non-Damaging edits are routed
for review. Our results suggest that ORES offers only moderate
assistance to human-augmented systems seeking to review
edits made by privacy seekers using Tor.
C. Topic Modeling
Although average quality may be similar, Tor editors may
differ systematically from other editors in terms of what
they choose to edit. Knowing which topics Tor users edit
might provide insight into their reasons for seeking anonymity
and the value of their contributions. For example, Tor users
might pay more attention to matters that are sensitive and
controversial. Unfortunately, the Wikipedia category system
is an incredibly granular human-curated graph that is poorly
suited to the construction of coarse comparisons across broad
selections of articles [34].
Topic modeling may assist such an exploration by offering
clusters of keywords that can be interpreted as semantic topics
present in a collection of documents. One of the most popular
topic modeling techniques is called Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA)—a generative probabilistic model for collections of
discrete data such as text corpora [3]. Machine Learning
for Language Toolkit (MALLET) provides a widely used
way to use LDA [26]. Given a list of documents and a
number of topics, MALLET estimates a set of probability
distributions of topics over the vocabulary of unique words.
Fig. 6. A raster diagram showing the proportion of articles edited by each
comparison group (along the x-axis) with where the topic (along the y-axis)
is the single highest proportion.
With these probability distributions and a further inspection
of the keywords MALLET outputs, we can gain insight into
the kinds of subjects that Tor users and other groups of editors
pay attention to. While topic models are known to be unstable,
they are useful for comparing documents across a set of ex ante
groups.
Using our datasets of edits, we identified all the articles
edited by Tor users and our three comparison groups. Next,
we mined all textual content of these articles and then pro-
cessed them through MALLET to produce keywords and their
probability distributions. Because there is no optimal number
of topics, we ran the tool to find 10, 20, 30, and 40 topics.
For each number, we conducted four different runs to test the
consistency of the results. After these experiments, we found
that the results across the top five most frequent topics for each
group of edits are highly consistent, with only slight changes
in the keywords and the ranking. Because we felt that having
20 different clusters of keywords for the whole text corpora led
to the most reasonable and comprehensible topics, the results
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF ORES DEVELOPER-PREDICTED PERFORMANCE TO ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF OUR HAND-CODED SAMPLE OF EDITS MADE FROM TOR
WITHOUT FEATURE INJECTION (n = 847).
Scenario Optimizing
Constraint
Recommended
Threshold
Actual
(Predicted)
Accuracy
Actual
(Predicted)
Precision
Actual
(Predicted)
Filter Rate
Actual
(Predicted)
Recall
Result of Filtering
Automatic
Removal
Max. Recall
at Preci-
sion ≥ 90%
<5.5%
non damaging
.713 (.913) 1 (.909) .988 (.998) .040 (.045) 10 of 847 dropped due to
high confidence of dam-
age; prior hand coding
found all 10 of these to be
damaging
Route for
Human
Review
Max. Filter
Rate at
Recall ≥
75%
<68.6%
non damaging
.574 (.904) .396 (.226) .386 (.887) .814 (.751) 520 of 847 routed for hu-
man review due to mod-
est confidence of damage;
prior hand coding found
206 of these routed edits
to be damaging.
TABLE VIII
TOP 5 TOPICS FOR EACH DATASET
Tor IP First-time Registered
Politics Music Music Locations
Technology Movies & TV Locations Music
Locations Locations Movies & TV Politics
Movies & TV Politics Education Movies & TV
Religion Sports Politics Sports
reported below are from from LDA topic models estimated
using 20 topics. All other parameters needed for the LDA al-
gorithm were run with default values in MALLET. After fitting
LDA topics models with MALLET, we manually interpreted
each cluster of words and created an appropriate topic header.
For reference, we include the mapping of keyword collections
to topic headers we assigned in Table IX in our appendix.
As a mixture model, LDA treats every document as be-
longing to every topic, but to varying degrees. As a re-
sult, we identified the topic with the highest probability
and described each article as being “in” that topic for the
purposes of the comparisons between the groups of edits. A
Pearson’s Chi-squared test suggests that the distribution of
articles across topics is different between Tor editors and IP
editors (χ2 = 1655; df = 19; p < 0.01), First-time editors
(χ2 = 848; df = 19; p < 0.01), and Registered editors
(χ2 = 1508; df = 19; p < 0.01). These differences are
statistically significant after adjusting for multiple comparisons
using a Bonferroni correction and suggest that Tor editors,
although distinct from other groups of editors, are most similar
to First-time editors in their topic selections.
Our analysis shows some similarities between Tor editors’
interests and other groups. Table VIII compares the top 5
topics that each group focused most on. Fig. 6 visualizes the
distribution of topics using a gradient where more prevalent
topics are darker and less prevalent topics are lighter. While
there are many horizontal bands of a similar shade where the
topics edited by our different sets of users are similar, we can
also see many differences.
For example, like other editors, Tor editors frequently edit
topics such as Movies and TV and Locations, which are
popular across all groups. We see proportionally fewer contri-
butions from Tor editors in the Sports, Soccer, and American
Football topics. Compared with other kinds of users, Tor
editors are more likely to contribute to articles corresponding
to Politics, Technology, and Religion—topics that may be
construed as controversial.29 Our findings provide evidence
to support previous qualitative work that has suggested that
sensitive or stigmatized topics might attract Wikipedia editors
interested in using tools like Tor to conceal their identity [14].
VII. LIMITATIONS
Our work is limited in several important ways. First, our
results are limited in that our analysis is conducted only on En-
glish Wikipedia. We cannot know how this work would extend
to users of privacy-enhancing technologies other than Tor or
to user-generated content sites beyond English Wikipedia. As
a minimal first step, we attempted to speak to this limitation
by conducting an analysis of editing activity made by Tor
users in other language editions of Wikipedia. Although we
do not report on them in depth, we have included information
in the appendix (see Tab. X) that displays the number of Tor
edits in different language editions of Wikipedia relative to
contributions made by the communities as a whole. Although
Tor users are active in many language editions of Wikipedia,
only a small number of edits by Tor users evaded the ban.
There are reasons to imagine that the behavior of Tor
editors contributing to English Wikipedia might differ from
that of editors in language editions. For example, we identify
thousands of edits from Tor exit nodes contributing to the Rus-
sian Wikipedia edition. This is striking because the Russian
government partially bans access to Tor30 and Wikipedia.31
Although a closer inspection of Wikipedia language editions
may yield interesting motivational and cultural differences
29https://www.thebalancecareers.com/topics-to-avoid-discussing-at-work-526267
(Archived: https://perma.cc/G4GT-GEAK)
30https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/
russia-passes-bill-banning-tor-vpns/ (Archived: https://perma.cc/
DLN7-KTQT)
31https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship of Wikipedia#Russia
(Archived: https://perma.cc/GNM4-9UNH)
regarding anonymity-seeking practice, our team is not suf-
ficiently versed in these languages to conduct a replication
of our analyses across different Wikipedia language editions.
We are making our full datasets available and invite other
researchers’ interest.
Of course, Wikipedia language editions do not necessarily
imply the geographic locations of editors. We do not know if
people editing Russian Wikipedia come from Russia. Addi-
tionally, in many countries, viewers primarily access English
Wikipedia even when English is not their native language.32
For example, the majority of pageviews from China and Iran—
countries that ban both access to Tor and Wikipedia—go to
the English version of Wikipedia. English Wikipedia is also
the primarily-viewed Wikipedia for many countries that do
not have a history of banning access to Wikipedia, such as the
Netherlands and Croatia.
Our study is limited in other ways as well. Because our
study uses IP addresses and account names to identify editors,
we cannot know exactly how usernames and IP addresses
map onto people. Some users may choose different levels of
identifiability depending on the kinds of edits they wish to
make. For example, a registered editor may use Tor for certain
activities and not for others [14].
Additionally, our samples might reflect survivorship bias.
We simply cannot know if our sample of Tor edits is repre-
sentative of the edits that would occur if Wikipedia did not
block anonymity-seeking users. Many Tor users who are told
by Wikipedia that Tor is blocked will not try again. As a result,
our dataset might overrepresent casual one-off Wikipedia
contributors, including both constructive “wiki gnomes” and
drive-by vandals. Our sample might also over-represent indi-
viduals with a deep commitment to editing Wikipedia or with
technical sophistication (i.e., the knowledge that one could
repeatedly request new Tor circuits to find exit nodes that are
not banned by Wikipedia). Tor users who manage to evade
the ban might include committed activists as well as banned
Wikipedia users with deeply held grudges. Although we do not
know what else would happen if Wikipedia unblocked Tor, we
know that the almost total end of contributions to Wikipedia
from Tor in 2013 means that, at a minimum, a large number
of high-quality contributions are not occurring. Our analysis
describes some part of what is being lost today—both good
and bad—due to Wikipedia’s decision to continue blocking
users of anonymity-protecting proxies.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN
Wikipedia’s imperfect blocking of Tor provides a unique
opportunity to gain insight into what might not be happen-
ing when user-generated content sites block participation by
anonymity-seeking users. We employed multiple methods to
compare Tor contributions to a number of comparison groups.
Our findings suggest that privacy seekers’ contributions are
more often than not comparable to those of IP editors and
32https://stats.wikimedia.org/wikimedia/animations/wivivi/wivivi.html
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First-time editors in many ways. Using hand-coded data and
a machine-learning classifier, we estimated that edits from
Tor users are of similar quality to those by IP editors and
First-time editors. We estimated that Tor users make more
higher quality contributions than other IP editors, on average,
as measured by PTRs. Our analysis also pointed to several
important differences. We found that Tor users are significantly
more likely than other users to revert someone else’s work and
appear more likely to violate Wikipedia’s policy against back-
and-forth edit wars, especially on discussion pages. Tor users
also edit topics that are systematically different from other
groups. We found that Tor editors focused more on topics
related to religion, technology, and politics and less on topics
related to sports and music.
The Tor network is steadily growing, with approximately
two million active users at the time of writing. Many com-
munities around the world face Internet censorship and au-
thoritarian surveillance. In order to be Wikipedia contributors,
these communities must rely on anonymity-protecting tools
like Tor. In our opinion, our results show that the potential
value to be gained by creating a pathway for Tor contributors
may exceed the potential harm. Wikipedia’s systemic block
of Tor editors remains controversial within the Wikipedia
community. We have been in close contact with Wikipedia
contributors and staff at the Wikimedia Foundation as we
conducted this research to ensure that our use of Wikipedia
metrics is appropriate and to give them advance notice of
our results. We are hopeful that our work can inform the
community and encourage them to explore mechanisms by
which Tor users might legitimately contribute to Wikipedia—
perhaps with additional safeguards. Given the advances of
the privacy research community (including anonymous black-
listing tools such as Nymble [35]), and improvements in
automated damage-detecting tools in Wikipedia, alternatives
to an outright ban on Tor contributions may be feasible
without substantially increasing the burden already borne by
the vandal-fighting efforts of the Wikipedia community. We
hope our findings will inform progress toward these ends.
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APPENDIX
TABLE IX
TOPIC LABELS AND CLUSTERS OF KEYWORDS.
Topics Keywords
Soccer league cup goals club team season stadium football match world
clubs years united won final goal scored played caps win
Sports score team world match championship win open round title seed
won wrestling event time champion final defeated mexico san lost
Biology species food water found made large sea fish animals common
red island white small called years north animal south long
Drama TV back time family episode father death life man mother house
season series make home son end find friend friends story
Military war army military forces force battle british general air killed
ship attack united u.s states troops police german soviet command
Locations city area county park north river south west town station
street population london state east district located road built national
Male Biographies american john born james william george robert actor english player
david british united york thomas michael henry charles years richard
Health health disease people treatment medical found research study sexual human
blood risk effects cells children studies include symptoms brain age
Music album music song band released single songs tour rock chart
albums number records live guitar video year top label love
Technology utc system data software windows talk users internet support information
version wikipedia computer network systems page mobile user content web
Physics energy water system light power time form space surface high
called number process heat large field mass theory temperature gas
Transportation air airport aircraft company car engine international flight airlines system
service cars speed model year production line design vehicles vehicle
American Football season game team games player football league record teams year
won coach played bowl players win championship points nfl career
Religion church book century god work life world early press history
published society religious time people books modern jewish women christian
Movies film series show television award season episode awards role films
episodes movie year september time production released actor comedy channel
Video Games game games series released character comics characters japanese player japan
world version time video players story battle team original unknown
Europe french france century german russian empire europe european roman republic
population italian language greek king germany italy russia world spanish
Asia india indian chinese china pakistan tamil sri muslim khan islamic
ali state dynasty islam hindu government south temple asia muslims
Education school university college students education high state schools campus research
science national student year center program institute medical public arts
Politics states government united state party law president national public u.s
court political rights act people election years international economic federal
Fig. 7. Distribution of articles across namespaces for the four groups of edits.
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Fig. 8. ROC curve depicting false positive rate relative to the false negative rate for our sample user groups using the Non-Damaging model.
TABLE X
TOR USERS’ ACTIVITIES ON VARIOUS WIKIPEDIA LANGUAGE EDITIONS
Language Editions Total number of edits Number of edits made by Tor users
German 319,424,685 6,019
Russian 67,743,927 3,795
Spanish 78,601,767 2,343
French 107,609,670 1,632
Chinese 34,855,810 1,388
Polish 48,483,852 456
Swedish 41,298,921 437
Finnish 16,377,486 261
Vietnamese 36,846,744 179
Dutch 95,223,918 141
